Posting on the post-pandemic lottery website the New York Times, the authors write that while the lottery might have been an improvement in terms of getting people to use the system, it had a “tremendous amount of risks.”
And with the $4 billion it generated, the paper says, “the risk of an initial failure was high.”
They point out that the lottery’s initial rollout cost $2 billion and, by the time the company came around to implementing a more robust system, that was already more than $10 billion.
In addition, they write, the system had been designed with the help of an outside consultant who, despite his flaws, had an eye on the potential for improvement.
“If you had an experienced consultant who knew the system and had worked with the system before and knew what you were doing, and were well-trained, they could have been invaluable,” the authors conclude.
“The system they built was flawed, but it was a system.”
Read more here.
The lottery, they say, is a system designed to be fixed.
And it was never fixed.
And yet, the book makes a point of not saying that.
They write that if the company had been better at keeping its systems up to date, it could have avoided a huge number of failures.
And yet, if you have an experienced, highly skilled consultant who knows the system well and is well-prepared, then you can be a system expert.
Read more here The authors note that while they write about the problems of the lottery, there are a number of other, smaller problems that the system has to cope with.
One of those, they point out, is that there are now a total of 9.8 million names in the system.
That’s nearly five times the number who had registered when the system was first rolled out.
What the authors do not say is that many of those 9.7 million people, many of whom were registered on the system for the first time, have no idea that they have registered on that list, or that they’ve been listed as being registered on it.
They do not point out the number of people who have registered for the lottery who are not on the list, because the system is only aware of those who have been registered.
The system is designed to help people find jobs, they note, and, in the end, the only thing the authors say the system could do to help the system cope with the massive increase in registrations is to give people the option of signing up for an alternate form of identification.
They argue that the government’s plan to remove the lottery as a payment option for welfare recipients is one reason why the system’s success has been so far disappointing.
“The government’s proposed changes to the lottery are a major improvement over the system that the company built, but they are not enough to solve the problems that still exist,” they write.
“Instead, the government should be looking at the future of the system by implementing more effective solutions to address the growing number of welfare beneficiaries without the need to remove a tool that has proven to be highly effective at helping people find work and secure a secure pension.”
In fact, one of the book’s key findings is that the financial benefits of the new system are likely to be far less than the costs, if at all.
The authors conclude that the failure of the systems success is not that the systems are too large to fail, but that they were too small.
“If the lottery system was the only major system in the world that has a failure rate of more than 2% it would be the greatest failure rate in human history,” they conclude.
Read more about the lottery here The author of the article, Jonathan R. Haidt, is Professor of Communication and Social Psychology at the University of Washington, where he is also Director of the Center for Communication Research at the Institute for Advanced Study.
He has authored numerous books and articles on communication, including Communication Theory: The Psychology of Distributed Information and The Communication and Human Values Handbook: An Introduction to Psychology.